Existential Medicine

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PHIL 20107 Introduction to Sartre

This course will probably be devoted Jean-Paul Sartre being a philosopher, as being a writer, being a literary essayist and as a great existential psychoanalysis. Sartre uncovered most of his « existentialist » philosophy, based on the discovery of the absolute freedom of the person and of her being-thrown in an meaningless universe, through philosophical dry treatises, but as well in employing more accessible literary forms, like novels and theaters plays.

In checking out Sartre’s multiple ways of dealing with abstract philosophical thesis (contingency of being, throwness of the person, absolute sensible responsibility of individuals), we will raise with Sartre the question about the regards between the contact form mobilized and the metaphysical content material deployed in each case and show through which way the very first is never recommended to the second.

Another element of our search will be to make sense of Sartre’s practice of the literary article about different writers through the form of the portrait. That practice is related and works as exemplifications of what Sartre cell phone calls « Existential psychoanalysis ». The main thought of Sartre’s practice of the « portrait » is to discover « modes of phenomenalization » from the contingent thing-in-itself, specific with each individual. By that means, Sartre’s Existential psychoanalysis is supposed to lead us to the discovery of the mainspecificcommunityof each and every other copy writers Sartre publishes articles about help to make sense from the hidden meaning of their fictional works. We will see in which way each of them represents essential top features of the human state described by simply existentialist beliefs, especially Baudelaire, Genet and Flaubert.


Existential Medicine explores the recent impact that the philosophies of existentialism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics have had on the health care professions. A growing body of scholarship drawing primarily on the work of Martin Heidegger and other influential twentieth-century figures such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Hans-Georg Gadamer has shaped contemporary research in the fields of bioethics, narrative medicine, gerontology, enhancement medicine, psychiatry and psychotherapy, and palliative care, among others. By regarding the human body as a decontextualized object, the prevailing paradigm of medical science often overlooks the body as it is lived . As a result, it fails to critically engage the experience of illness and the core questions of ‘what it means’ and ‘what it feels like’ to be ill. With work from emerging and renowned scholars in the field, this collection aims to shed light on these issues and the crucial need for clinicians to situate the experience of illness within the context of a patient’s life-world. To this end, Existential Medicine offers a valuable resource for philosophers and medical humanists, as well as health care practitioners.

Acknowledgments / Editor’s Introduction: Existential Medicine: Heidegger and the Lessons from Zollikon, Kevin Aho / Part I: New Currents in Existential Psychiatry / 1. The Cure for Existential Authenticity, Shaun Gallagher / 2. Emotional Disturbance, Trauma, and Authenticity: An Existential-Phenomenological Perspective, Robert Stolorow / 3. Beyond the Ontological Difference: Heidegger, Binswanger, and the Future of Existential Analysis, Anthony Fernandez / 4. Between Anxiety and Nostalgia, Dylan Trigg / Part II: Phenomenologies of Anxiety, Pain, and Death / 5. The World of Chronic Pain: A Dialogue, Martin Kusch and Matthew Ratcliffe / 6. On the Autós of Autonomous Decision-Making: Intercorporeality, Temporality and Enacted Normativities in Transplantation Medicine, Kristin Zeiler 7. Reclaiming Embodiment in Medically Unexplained Physical Symptoms (MUPS), Jenny Slatman / 8. Heidegger, Curing Aging, and the Desirability of Immortality, Adam Buben / Part III: Ethics, Medicalization, and Technology / 9. Heidegger’s Philosophy of Technology and the Perils of Medicalization, Fredrik Svenaeus / 10. Breathlessness: From Bodily Symptom to Existential Experience, Tina Williams and Havi Carel / 11. Heideggerian Ethics and the Permissibility of Bio- and Nano-Medicine, Tara Kennedy / Part IV: Existential Health / 12. Losing the Measure of Health: Phenomenological Reflections on the Role of Techne in Health Care Today, Carolyn Culbertson / 13. Existential Medicine and the Intersubjective Body, John Russon and Kirsten Jacobson / 14. Health Like a Broken Hammer or The Strange Wish to Make Health Disappear, Nicole Piemonte and Ramsey Eric Ramsey / 15. What is it to Age Well? Re-visioning Later Life, Drew Leder

Kevin Aho is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Communication and Philosophy at Florida Gulf Coast University. He is the author of Existentialism: An Introduction (2014), Heidegger’s Neglect of the Body (2009), and co-author of Body Matters: A Phenomenology of Sickness, Illness, and Disease (2008).

3 The rising of feminist phenomenology and its themes

The recent feminist turn toward traditional or classical phenomenology, and the combining of phenomenological insights with critical feminist queries, is not yet an organized movement or a systematic school of thought. The situation is very similar to that of the last century: Individual scholars operate separately without much support from permanent institutions and without systematic or continuous connection to each other’s work. Over the past few decades, several young philosophers, usually trained in classical phenomenology and/or existentialism as well as feminist theory have, on the one hand, applied phenomenological methods to feminist topics and, on the other hand, proposed critical feminist questions concerning unrecognized prejudices operative in the canon of phenomenology. Mirroring the institutional dispersion of feminist phenomenology, the articles presented in this volume come from philosophers working in different scholarly environments across the globe (Austria, Canada, Finland, Hungary, Sweden, and the United States) and while each contributor recognizes and refers to the work of other philosophers struggling with similar questions, it is clear that we are still at the beginnings of what could be called an established movement or a school of Feminist Phenomenology. 16

However, all contemporary feminist phenomenologists have at least one shared characteristic: In order to explicate the experience of sexual difference, they all turn to the conceptual and methodological resources of the tradition, despite its neglect of feminist concerns. One could perhaps say that these scholars believe more in the letter of Husserl’s program of a rigorous, unprejudiced science than what can be seen in its execution in the tradition. While recognizing that most canonical works bypass feminist questions about subjectivity and being, and while admitting that some of these texts are simply hostile to women and/or the feminine, feminist phenomenologists claim to find powerful concepts and methods, as well as fruitful questions, in original phenomenological works and in their unprejudiced interpretations. Specifically, they see these sources as indispensable in their attempts to answer fundamental questions concerning the meaning of sexual difference, the gendered body, and equality in difference.

Despite their common indebtedness to original sources and the methods of inquiry established in them, feminist phenomenologists have many different thematic concerns and interests. Their works address a great variety of topics, from the constitution of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, to expressivity, language, spatiality, temporality, and embodiment, and they cut across the different subfields of philosophy, from epistemology and logic to ethics and political theory. When developing their accounts of sexual difference and embodiment, feminist phenomenologists also address classical feminist issues, such as sexuality, desire, maternity, education, and the assumption of gendered roles. In each case, however, they carry out analyses that touch on the phenomenological core of the issue at hand: the lived experience of the gendered subject.

That sa >feminist is that it rejects the assumption of a neutralhomogenous or unitarysubject and proceeds from the concreteness of sexual difference or gendered life. Thus, one can, for example, analyze the objectification of the other in light of gendered experiences of embodiment; inquire into one’s own self-constitution as a woman or a man (or both); study the sensual experience and expression of the body without abstracting from sexual difference; or work critically through the re-presentations that racist and sexist communities and cultures impose on human individualsto name just a few approaches.

Developing this line of argument, papers in this volume offer constitutional analyses and interpretations of subjectivity, selfhood, otherness, and sensibility: Alia Al-Saji’s essay studies Husserl’s account of touch and works through its implications for feminist questions concerning selfhood and otherness. Ulrika Björk’s paper addresses the questions of self-constitution, intersubjectivity, and love through Beauvoir’s existential philosophy and literature. Lisa Käll’s essay explicates the constitution of the other in light of Sartre’s existential phenomenology and shows how questions of gender and race can be interconnected within the Sartrean framework. Linda Fisher thematizes voice as an aspect of expressive embodiment, and asks how sexual difference is given in our auditory self-experience.

The second category of feminist phenomenology can best be characterized as engaging in close dialogue with other areas of contemporary philosophy, such as the history of philosophy, postmodern theories of identity and power, or postpragmatist and postanalytical inquiries into perception, knowledge, justice, and the good life. The fields of these dialogues range from ethics and aesthetics to metaphysics and ontology. This type of feminist phenomenology usually includes detailed analyses and interpretations of experiences, but it also carries out extensive comparative work between phenomenology and other philosophical approaches. The comparisons concern concepts used and developed, methods defended or presupposed, as well as arguments and their implications. Often, such studies lay the groundwork for showing the strength of feminist phenomenology in the analysis of gendered experiences.

In this volume, comparative approaches relate phenomenology to postmodernism, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, and analytical ethics. Silvia Stoller argues that Judith Butler is incorrect when she claims that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expression is essentialist; instead, the contributions that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology can make to feminist issues are more in alignment with Butler’s approach than Butler recognizes. Anne Van Leeuwen studies He >Daseinbecause of Radiazione luminosa Irigaray’s essential comments and constructive function, both of which in turn accentuate the inevitability of sexual difference. Janet Donohoe offers an original reading of Husserl’s comments on parenthood and the ethical meanings mixed up in child–parent connection.

As a whole, this kind of volume is intended to file some of the progressive work previously being carried out in the area of feminist phenomenology, and to support the mutual reputation of scholars in this area. The possibilities of interchange and co-operation rely, as always, upon institutional parameters and working conditions. This compilation should support the establishment of such buildings, and to function as a reference to the near future, showing or perhaps anticipating guidelines for producing work in the field. The essays here bring to the fore new topical areas and pieces of concerns in which phenomenological methods may be employedand happen to be being employed efficiently. At the same time, the quantity thematizes issues that will stimulate new critical questions regarding the adequacy and tenability of phenomenological philosophy and its stability in the area of rivalling philosophical strategies. In doing so , it demonstrates the validity of feminist phenomenological work and the involvement of the college students carrying it out.

The editors wish to extend their very own sincere honor to Continental Philosophy Assessmentand Springer web publishers for making this Special Issue possible, and even more specifically, pertaining to providing a space where recent work in feminism and phenomenology can be represented and known. A special thanks goes out to Anthony Steinbock, for his faith in our project, his patience, fantastic continuous support of the idea from the very beginning.

Intuition Change

Intuition in phenomenology refers to those cases where the intentional object is definitely directly present to the intentionality at play; if the goal is filled by the direct apprehension with the object, you have an intuited object. Using a cup of coffee ahead, for instance, discovering it, feeling it, or perhaps imagining this – these are all stuffed intentions, as well as the object can now beintuited. A similar goes for the apprehension of mathematical formulae or a amount. If you do not have the object as referred to immediately, the object is definitely not intuited, but still meant, but thenemptily. Examples of bare intentions could be signitive intentions – intentions that onlyimplyorrefer totheir things.

Intentionality Change

Intentionality refers to the notion that consciousness is always consciousnessofsomething. The word itself should not be confused with the ordinary utilization of the word intentional, but will need to rather be studied as playing on the etymological roots from the word. At first, intention referred to a stretching out (in tension, lat.intendere), and in this kind of context this refers to awareness stretching awayinch towards it is object. Intentionality is often summed up as aboutness.

Whether thissomethingthat awareness is about is at direct belief or in fantasy is usually inconsequential to the concept of intentionality itself; no matter what consciousness can be directed atthatis what intelligence is intelligence of. This means that the object of consciousness will notpossessto become aphysicaltarget apprehended in perception: it can just as well be considered a fantasy or maybe a memory. As a result, these structures of awareness, i. elizabeth., perception, memory space, fantasy, etc ., are calledintentionalities.

The cardinal principle of phenomenology, the definition of intentionality started with the Scholastics in the medieval period and was resurrected by Brentano whom in turn motivated Husserl’s pregnancy of phenomenology, who enhanced the term to make it the cornerstone of his theory of mind. The meaning of the term can be complex and depends completely on how it is conceived with a given thinker. The term ought not to be confused with intention or the psychoanalytic conception of unconscious motive or gain.

Phenomenology and East thought Change

Some experts in phenomenology (particularly in comparison with He > Furthermore, it has been believed that a number of elements within just phenomenology (mainly He > Relating to Tomonubu Imamichi, the concept ofDaseinwas inspired although This individual

There are also the latest signs of the reception of phenomenology (and He > maybe under the roundabout influence from the tradition with the French Orientalist and philosopher Henri Corbin.

Additionally , the work of Jim Ruddy in the field of comparison philosophy, combined the concept of Transcendental Ego in Husserl’s phenomenology with the notion of the primacy of self-consciousness in the function of Sankaracharya. In the course of this kind of work, Ruddy uncovered a wholly new at the

Empathy and Intersubjectivity Change

In phenomenology, empathy identifies the experience of an additional human body as another subjectivity: In one sense, you see another body, but what you immediately understand or knowledge is another subject. In Husserl’s original accounts, this was made by a sort of apperception built around the experiences of your personal lived-body. The lived-body can be your own body because experienced all on your ownsinceyour self. Your own body manifests itself to you personally mainly or if you possibilities of behaving in the world. It really is what lets you reach out and grab something, for instance, it also, and more importantly, allows for the possibility of changing your standpoint. This helps you differentiate one thing from one other by the experience of moving around that, seeing new aspects of that (often known as making the absent present and the present absent), and still retaining the idea that this is a same thing that you just saw additional aspects of just a moment ago (it is usually identical). Your body is also skilled as a mix and match, both as object (you actually can touch your personal hand) as your individual subjectivity (you actually are becoming touched).

The expertise of your own body otherwise you own subjectivity is then placed on the experience of another’s body, which usually, through apperception, is constituted as another subjectivity. You can hence recognise the Other’s motives, emotions, etc . This experience of empathy is very important in the phenomenological account of intersubjectivity. In phenomenology, intersubjectivity is what comprises objectivity (i. e., the things you experience because objective is experienced as being intersubjectively available – available to all other subjects. That is not imply that objectivity is decreased to subjectivity nor can it imply a relativist placement, cf. as an example intersubjective verifiability).

In the connection with intersubjectivity, one particular also encounters oneself as being a subject between other themes, and one experiences yourself as existing objectivelyforthese Other folks; one experience oneself while the noema of Others’ noeses, or as a subject in another’s empathic experience. As such, a single experiences yourself as objectively existing subjectivity. Intersubjectivity is also a part in the constitution of the lifeworld, especially as homeworld.

you Historical beginning points

Phenomenological inquiries in the sexually differentiated aspects of human experience and conscious your life date back to the 1930s and 1940s. These early requests are not restricted to the expeditions of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, or perhaps Lévinas, yet consist of the rich and detailed explanations and examines developed by female phenomenologists, most prominently Edith Stein and Simone de Beauvoir.

Stein developed a pioneering theory of human types, based on her interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology and Thomist theology and anthropology. Her main desire for the question of girls was educational and religious, but her philosophical anthropology and her theory of personality include conceptual innovative developments and methodological insights which can be interesting into a contemporary phenomenology of sex relations. 3 Most importantly, Stein’s descriptions and analyses of feminine and masculine types of intelligence, with different vertical structures, suggest unsettling concerns about the unity and homogeneity of your intersubjective life.

Simone para Beauvoir applied Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s ideas of embodied consciousness to account for the structural variations in women’s and men’s experiences of temporality and substantialness. 4 These kinds of existential accounts of embodiment rested upon Husserlian differences, most importantly the distinction involving the lived human body and the physical object ( Leib– Körper) and the differentiation between 3 attitudes that people can take towards such body, i. e., naturalistic, personalistic, and phenomenological. However , Beauvoir’s indebtedness and contribution for the tradition had not been restricted to an account of sexually differing physiques. Recent educational work shows that the girl contributed, by simply her honest essays and novels, to contemporary philosophical debates about the phenomena of mortality and futurity, plus the relationship between the self and the other.

Both Stein and Beauvoir had been outspoken feminists: Stein produced her feminist insight in her lectures on can certainly education, and Beauvoir shown a feminist account of sexual hierarchies in her >The other Sex( Le deuxième sexe49 ). But there were various other phenomenologists whom refrained by taking any kind of feminist stand, or who attacked this kind of stands, yet who thematized, interpreted, and analyzed phenomena which later became central for feminist phenomenologists. Hannah Arendt’s unique and inventive discourse of natality and the event of birth is probably the best regarded of these conceptual innovations, but there is also interesting material in Scheler’s moral works, in Fink’s philosophical anthropology, in Schutz’s theory of ethnical and social types, in addition to the existential psychoanalysis defined by Binswangeras well as with Husserl’s individual research notes on generativity and travel intentionality. a few

In the 1970s and 1980s, phenomenological accounts of embodiment and sexuality were connected to, and merged with, other theoretical approaches. French feminists, most significantly Irigaray and Kristeva, designed new mixtures of existential phenomenology and psychoanalysis, based upon Freud’s and Lacan’s accounts of the subconscious. 6 Canadian and Australian feminists, such as Dorothea Johnson, Lorraine Code, and Genevieve Lloyd, provided strong feminist critiques of epistemological universalism, influenced by several different sourcesSartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Schutz included. 7 In the united states, feminist thinkers became acquainted with Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophies through the evaluations of emigrated phenomenologists including Arendt, Schutzmechanismus, and Aron Gurwitsch. One more context was provided by American interpretations, advancements, and critiques of classical and People from france existentialism. eight Here continental sources had been connected to pragmatist and postpragmatist currents, and new hypotheses of ladies experience had been developed with this heterogeneous basis. 9

Such fusions are not surprising, because phenomenology stocks and shares several central topicsexperience, subjectivity, duration, and intersubjectivitywith psychoanalysis, pragmatism, and social theory. Methodologically, however , these innovations involved complications, as they neglected or forgotten the differentiation between transcendental or ontological inquiries and empirical research. Phenomenology was taken in a non-technical feeling and utilized to refer to the philosophical or human medical discourse about experience, 10 and many propagators of the strategy lost contact with the transcendental aspirations that originally had motivated the undertaking.

The idea of Phenomenology Edit

In its most elementary form, phenomenology attempts to produce conditions pertaining to the objective examine of matters usually viewed as subjective: mind and the content of conscious experiences just like judgments, awareness, and feelings. Although phenomenology seeks to become scientific, will not attempt to study consciousness from your perspective of clinical mindset or neurology. Instead, that seeks through systematic reflection to determine the necessary properties and structures of consciousness and conscious encounter.

Husserl produced many essential concepts central to phenomenology from the functions and lectures of his teachers, the philosophers and psychologists Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf. An essential element of phenomenology that Husserl borrowed via Brentano was intentionality (often described as aboutness), the notion that consciousness is always consciousnessofsomething. The item of consciousness is called theintentional object, and this thing is constituted for mind in many different methods, through for instance perception, storage, retention and protention, importance, etc . During these different intentionalities, though they have several structures and various ways of staying about the item, an object continues to be constituted as the same similar object; consciousness is inclined to the same intentional object in direct belief as it is inside the immediately following preservation of this object and the later remembering of computer.

Though a lot of the phenomenological methods involve different reductions, phenomenology is essentially anti-reductionistic; the cutbacks are simple tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, to never reduce any phenomenon to descriptions. Quite simply, when a reference is made to a thing’sessenceoridea, or once one specifics the metabolism of an identical coherent factor by explaining what one really views as being only these attributes and aspects, these floors, it does not signify the thing is only and specifically what is described here: The best goal of such reductions is usually to understandhowthese different factors are constituted into the genuine thing while experienced by the person encountering it. Phenomenology is a immediate reaction to the psychologism and physicalism of Husserl’s period.

Although recently employed by Hegel, it was Husserl’s adoption on this term (circa 1900) that propelled this into turning into the designation of a philosophical school. As a philosophical perspective, phenomenology is definitely its method, though the specific meaning of the term varies according to how it truly is conceived with a given thinker. As envisioned by Husserl, phenomenology can be described as method of philosophical inquiry that rejects the rationalist prejudice that has focused Western thought since Avenirse in favor of a method of reflective attentiveness that discloses the person’s lived experience. Usually rooted in an epistemological system, with Sceptic roots, known as epoché, Husserl’s method entails the suspension of wisdom while depending upon the user-friendly grasp of knowledge, free of presuppositions and intellectualizing. Sometimes depicted as the science of experience, the phenomenological method is seated in intentionality, Husserl’s theory of consciousness (developed by Brentano). Intentionality represents a substitute for the representational theory of consciousness which will holds that reality can not be grasped immediately because it is obtainable only through perceptions of reality which can be representations of computer in the brain. Husserl countered that mind is not really in your brain but rather aware about something apart from itself (the intentional object), whether the object is a compound or a figment of imagination (i. elizabeth. the real processes associated with and underlying the figment). Consequently the phenomenological method depends on the explanation of trends as they are given to consciousness, in their immediacy.

In accordance to Maurice Natanson (1973, p. 63)The radicality of the phenomenological method is both continuous and unsuccessive[obs3], broken, interrupted with philosophy’s general hard work to subject matter experience to fundamental, important scrutiny: to take nothing with no consideration and to show the warranty for what we claims to know. inchIn practice, it entails an unusual combination of discipline and detachment to suspend, or bracket, theoretical explanations and second-hand information while determining one’s naive experience of the matter. The phenomenological method serves to momentarily erase the world of speculation by returning the subject to his or her primordial experience of the matter, whether the object of inquiry is a feeling, an idea, or a perception. According to Husserl the suspension of belief in what we ordinarily take for granted or infer by conjecture diminishes the power of what we customarily embrace as objective reality. According to Safranski (1998, 72), [Husserl and his followers’] great ambition was to disregard anything that had until then been thought or said about consciousness or the world [while] on the lookout for a new way of letting the things [they investigated] approach them, without covering them up with what they already knew.

Books (French and English):

Derrida/Searle, déconstruction et langage ordinaire (Paris, PUF, Philosophies, 2009), 153 pp.

Zizek, Marxisme et psychanalyse , with Ronan de Calan (Paris, PUF, Philosophies, 2012), 153 pp.

Evénements Nocturnes, Essai sur Totalité et Infini , Préface de Jocelyn Benoist (Paris, Hermann, Le Bel Aujourd’hui, 2012), 380 pp.

Derrida/Searle, Deconstruction and Ordinary Language , foreword Jean-Michel Rabaté (New-York, Columbia University Press, 2014), 165 pp.

Derrida et le langage ordinaire (Paris, Hermann, Le Bel Aujourd’hui, 2014), 460 pp.

The Night of Being: A Guide to Levinas’s Totality and Infinity , New-York, Fordham University Press, 2016. 210p.

Sartre et le mystère en pleine lumière Paris, Cerf, 2019.

The term

The term continental philosophy , in the above sense, was first w

However, the term (and its approximate sense) can be found at least as early as 1840, in John Stuart Mill’s 1840 essay on Coler > This notion gained prominence in the early 20th century as figures such as Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore advanced a vision of philosophy closely allied with natural science, progressing through logical analysis. This tradition, which has come to be known broadly as analytic philosophy, became dominant in Britain and the United States from roughly 1930 onward. Russell and Moore made a dismissal of Hegelianism and its philosophical relatives a distinctive part of their new movement. Commenting on the history of the distinction in 1945, Russell distinguished two schools of philosophy, which may be broadly distinguished as the Continental and the British respectively, a division he saw as operative from the time of Locke.

Since the 1970s, however, many philosophers in the United States and Britain have taken interest in continental philosophers since Kant, and the philosophical traditions in many European countries have similarly incorporated many aspects of the analytic movement. Self-described analytic philosophy flourishes in France, including philosophers such as Jules Vuillemin, Vincent Descombes, Gilles Gaston Granger, François Recanati, and Pascal Engel. Likewise, self-described continental philosophers can be found in philosophy departments in the United Kingdom, North America, and Australia, and some well-known analytic philosophers claim to conduct better scholarship on continental philosophy than self- > Continental philosophy is thus defined in terms of a family of philosophical traditions and influences rather than a geographic distinction. The issue of geographical specificity has been raised again more recently in post-colonial and decolonial approaches to continental philosophy, which critically examine the ways that European imperial and colonial projects have influenced academic knowledge production. For this reason, some scholars have advocated for post-continental philosophy as an outgrowth of continental philosophy.

Existential phenomenology Edit

Existential phenomenology differs from transcendental phenomenology by its rejection of the transcendental ego. Merleau-Ponty objects to the ego’s transcendence of the world, which for Husserl leaves the world spread out and completely transparent before the conscious. Heidegger thinks of a conscious being as always already in the world. Transcendence is maintained in existential phenomenology to the extent that the method of phenomenology must take a presuppositionless starting point – transcending claims about the world arising from, for example, natural or scientific attitudes or theories of the ontological nature of the world.

While Husserl thought of philosophy as a scientific discipline that had to be founded on a phenomenology understood as epistemology, Heidegger held a radically different view. Heidegger himself states their differences this way:

For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For us, phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the Being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed).

According to Heidegger, philosophy was not at all a scientific discipline, but more fundamental than science itself. According to him science is only one way of knowing the world with no special access to truth. Furthermore, the scientific mindset itself is built on a much more primordial foundation of practical, everyday knowledge. Husserl was skeptical of this approach, which he regarded as quasi-mystical, and it contributed to the divergence in their thinking.

Instead of taking phenomenology as prima philosophia or a foundational discipline, He > Yet to confuse phenomenology and ontology is an obvious error. Phenomena are not the foundation or Ground of Being. Neither are they appearances, for as Heidegger argues in Being and Time , an appearance is that which shows itself in something else, while a phenomenon is that which shows itself in itself.

While for Husserl, in the epochè, being appeared only as a correlate of consciousness, for He

However, ontological being and existential being are different categories, so He

Existential phenomenologists include: Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976), Hannah Arendt (1906 – 1975), Emmanuel Levinas (1906 – 1995), Gabriel Marcel (1889 – 1973), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 – 1980), Paul Ricoeur (1913 – 2005) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 – 1961).


The history of continental philosophy (taken in its narrower sense) is usually thought to begin with German > Led by figures like Fichte, Schelling, and later Hegel, German idealism developed out of the work of Immanuel Kant in the 1780s and 1790s and was closely linked with romanticism and the revolutionary politics of the Enlightenment. Besides the central figures listed above, important contributors to German idealism also included Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Gottlob Ernst Schulze, Karl Leonhard Reinhold, and Friedrich Schleiermacher.

As the institutional roots of continental philosophy in many cases directly descend from those of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl has always been a canonical figure in continental philosophy. Nonetheless, Husserl is also a respected subject of study in the analytic tradition. Husserl’s notion of a noema, the non-psychological content of thought, his correspondence with Gottlob Frege, and his investigations into the nature of logic continue to generate interest among analytic philosophers.

J. G. Merquior argued that a distinction between analytic and continental philosophies can be first clearly identified with Henri Bergson (1859–1941), whose wariness of science and elevation of intuition paved the way for existentialism. Merquior wrote: the most prestigious philosophizing in France took a very dissimilar path [from the Anglo-Germanic analytic schools]. One might say it all began with Henri Bergson.

An illustration of some important differences between analytic and continental styles of philosophy can be found in Rudolf Carnap’s Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language (originally published in 1932 as Überwindung der Metaphysik durch Logische Analyse der Sprache), a paper some observers have described as particularly polemical. Carnap’s paper argues that He > In addition, Carnap claimed that many A language like german metaphysicians with the era were similar to Heidegger in writing transactions that were syntactically meaningless.

While using rise of Nazism, many of Germany’s philosophers, especially those of Jewish descent or leftist or tolerante political sympathies (such as much in the Vienna Circle and the Frankfurt School), fled to the English-speaking globe. Those philosophers who remainedif they continued to be in academia at allhad to get back together themselves to Nazi control over the universities. Others, such as Martin Heidegger, among the most dominant German philosophers to stay in Indonesia, developed a diplomatic romance with Nazism when it came to power.

Both before and after World War II there was clearly a growth of interest in The german language philosophy in France. A new interest in communism translated in an interest in Marx and Hegel, who also became the first time studied extensively in the noteworthy conservative France university system of the Third Republic. At the same time the phenomenological idea of Husserl and Heidegger became progressively influential, most likely owing to the resonances with French sagesse which placed great inventory in the first-person perspective (an idea seen in divergent varieties such as Cartesianism, spiritualism, and Bergsonism). Most crucial in this popularization of phenomenology was the author and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, who known as his idea existentialism. (See 20th-century France philosophy. ) Another major strain of continental believed is structuralism/post-structuralism. Influenced by structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, French scientists such as Claude Lévi-Strauss started to apply the structural paradigm to the humanities. In the 1960s and ’70s, post-structuralists developed various critiques of structuralism. Post-structuralist thinkers contain Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze.

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